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British Journal of Criminology 
 
CCTV: BEYOND PENAL MODERNISM? 
CLIVE NORRIS  and MICHAEL McCAHILL  
 
Abstract 
 
In recent years, a number of writers have suggested that contemporary strategies of crime 
control have called into question some of the central features of ‘penal modernism’. The 
return of punitively orientated ‘ostentatious’ forms of punishment whereby state 
representatives try to bring penal policy more in line with public sentiment is implicated 
(Pratt 2000; 2002). For other writers, the apparent erosion of state power accompanied by 
‘new modes of governance’ based upon ‘risk management’ rather than the normalization of 
individual offenders is at the centre of a shift towards a ‘late modern’ or ‘postmodern’ 
penality (Feeley and Simon 1994; Smandych 1999; Garland 1996). This article draws upon 
research conducted for the European Union-funded URBANEYE project1  to ask how the 
rapid growth in the use of CCTV in the UK fits in with contemporary debates on the 
emergence of a ‘post modern’ penality (Garland 1996 2001; Hallsworth 2002; Lucken 1999; 
O’Malley, 1999; Simon 1994). We begin with a review of the theoretical literature on visual 
surveillance. Next we draw upon our empirical research to provide an account of the extent 
and sophistication of CCTV usage in publicly accessible spaces in London. Finally, we 
examine the ‘practice of video surveillance’ in four different settings – an open-street CCTV 
system, a transport system (mainline railway station), West London Mall and South London 
Mall.  
                                                 
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge financial and research support from the European Commission’s 
Fifth Framework RTD Project on surveillance entitled URBANEYE which is part of a three year 
comparative project on the use of CCTV surveillance technology in seven European capital cities. We 
would also like to thank Paul Knepper and Nigel Norris, for their comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. 
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The debate concerning the transition from ‘modernity’ to ‘post modernity’ has been a central, 
although at times implicit, theme in much of the writing on ‘new surveillance technologies’. 
A number of writers, for example, have asked whether the emergence of ‘new surveillance’ 
technologies represents an extension of the ‘disciplinary power’ associated with the rise of 
‘modernity’. For instance, much of the sociological and criminological literature on CCTV 
has been dominated by images of the Panopticon, Jeremy Bentham’s proposal, written in 
1787, for an architectural system of social discipline, applicable to prisons, factories, 
workhouses and asylums. According to Fyfe and Bannister (1996), the spread of CCTV 
across British streets represents a dispersal of an ‘electronic panopticon’, while Reeve has 
argued that open-street CCTV systems, like the panopticon, act as ‘a device of total 
surveillance in a rationally ordered society’ (Reeve 1998: 71). The similarities of CCTV with 
the panoptic principles embodied in Bentham’s model prison with its central observation 
tower, staffed by an unseen observer, watching over the minutiae of a prisoner’s behaviour, 
housed in transparent cells, is of course, highly resonant. The spread of CCTV over city 
centre streets represents the most visible sign of the ‘dispersal of discipline’ from the prison to 
the factory and the school, to encompass all of the urban landscape. Moreover, since it is 
impossible to know whether one is being monitored, CCTV, like the panopticon, has the 
potential ‘to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the 
automatic functioning of power’ (Foucault 1977: 201).  
 
However, for other theorists the emergence of ‘new surveillance technologies’ has given rise 
to forms of social control that take us beyond the disciplinary power associated with the 
panopticon. For instance, several writers have argued that surveillance is no longer about the 
observation of particular individuals whose identity is known before hand; rather it is about 
the surveillance of geographical places, time periods and categories of person (Marx 2002: 10; 
Poster 1990; Lyon 2002). For Feeley and Simon (1994: 173) these changes are part of a 
paradigm shift in the criminal process from the ‘Old Penology’ to the ‘New Penology’. The 
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Old Penology was concerned with the identification of the individual criminal for the purpose 
of ascribing guilt and blame, and the imposition of punishment and treatment. The New 
Penology, on the other hand, is ‘concerned with techniques for identifying, classifying and 
managing groups assorted by levels of dangerousness’ (1994: 180) based not on 
individualised suspicion, but on the probability that an individual may be offender. For other 
writers, ‘new surveillance’ technologies are ‘post-disciplinary’ because they are based on a 
‘pre-emptive’ or ‘future-oriented’ approach that involves an intervention before any deviant 
act has taken place. From this perspective the introduction of video surveillance reduces ‘the 
number of occasions of any conceivable need for Panoptical surveillance on account of 
simulation, prediction and action before the act’ (Boyne 2000: 285; see also Bogard 1996; 
Graham 1998; Lianos and Douglas 2000). As Pat O’Malley (1996) has argued, this rejection 
of a concern with ‘causation’ and the ‘individual offender’ signals ‘not merely a redirection of 
particular policies but rather a shift away from the disciplinary technology of power itself’ 
(1996: 189; see also, Cohen 1985: 146-8).  
 
While acknowledging that the literature reviewed above provides a useful starting point for 
situating the emergence of CCTV within the ‘postmodern’ penality debate, we would argue 
that much of this debate is conducted at a very high level of abstraction. Consequently those 
who deploy these theoretical frameworks can often ‘mistake rhetoric for reality’ and fail to 
consider the aims, activities and values of penal actors themselves (Duff and Garland 1994; 
Lucken 1998: 108). In this article we aim to bridge the gap between the ‘grand theory’ of 
‘post modern’ penality and the ‘real world’ of current penal practice by drawing upon 
empirical research conducted for the European Union-funded URBANEYE project. Our 
analysis moves from the macro to the micro, beginning with an account of CCTVs rise to 
ubiquity in the UK. Next we use our empirical research to provide an overview of the extent 
of CCTV surveillance systems in London. Following this we go inside some of the capital’s 
CCTV control rooms to examine the practice of video surveillance in four different settings: a 
public CCTV network (open-street and housing), a transport system (mainline railway 
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station), West London Mall and South London Mall. Finally, we draw upon observational 
research conducted in a shopping mall control room to show how front-line operatives shape 
the operational procedures of CCTV systems. However, before doing any of this we will give 
a brief outline of our methodological approach.  
 
Methods 
 
As part of the comparative work for the URBANEYE project we collected data from a 
number sources. We began by conducting two surveys of CCTV in a South London Borough.  
In our first survey we contacted the managers or security managers of 27 major 
commercial/civic (publicly accessible) institutions in the Borough and conducted short 
telephone interviews2. For our second survey we were tasked to select a street (or streets) in a 
busy commercial/shopping district of approximately 1.5 kilometres in length. We then visited 
217 publicly accessible premises in order to identify whether or not they had a CCTV system 
and signage notifying the public of the operation of CCTV. We then contacted those with 
CCTV systems and conducted a short telephone interview, usually with the on-site manager. 
The fieldwork was carried out in March 2002 and the telephone interviews completed by the 
end of May 2002. 
 
After completing our questionnaires in a South London Borough, we conducted more detailed 
case studies on the use of CCTV in four different settings: a public CCTV network (open-
street and housing), a mainline railway station, West London Mall and South London Mall. 
These case studies were based on a total of 23 interviews3 with managers and front-line 
operatives at the different sites and observational research in the CCTV control rooms. At 
three of the sites we carried out ‘flashlight’ observations which involved brief visits to the 
                                                 
2 For the purpose of the URBANEYE project we were tasked to locate, from a list of 31 institutions, 
the nearest example of each institution from the central point of our commercial shopping district. 
3 These included tape-recorded interviews lasting approximately one hour and more informal 
conversations with security officers.  
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control rooms and informal conversations with those working on site. However, we also 
conducted more detailed observational research in the CCTV control room of South London 
Shopping Mall. Observations on this site were carried out by one of the researchers in the 
autumn of 2003. In total 120 hours of monitoring were observed – the equivalent of fifteen 
eight hour shifts between 9.00 am and 5.00 pm. All days of the week were covered except 
Sundays when the mall was not open for business. Only one CCTV operator monitored the 
system at any given time. During the 120 hours of observation all 10 of the security officers 
who worked the daytime shift were monitored as they sat at the control desk, although some 
of these officers worked in the control room for just an hour or so. A small notebook was used 
in the field when appropriate and full field notes, including full descriptions of any ‘targeted 
surveillance’4 were written up either immediately after they occurred or at the end of each 
shift. However, field notes on security officers’ values and beliefs, work tensions, and 
interactions in the control room were usually written up outside of the control room.  
 
CCTV in the UK - the rise to ubiquity 
 
One of the most striking features of contemporary penality is that it is ‘characterised by an 
unusual degree of incoherence and volatility’ (O’Malley 1999: 175; Garland 2001). Rising 
prison populations and the return of punitively orientated ‘ostentatious’ forms of punishment 
(Pratt 2002) sit alongside more pragmatic strategies such as the ‘commercialization of justice’ 
and the shift towards ‘situational’ methods of crime prevention. For David Garland, these 
developments are the result of ‘a new criminological predicament ... the normality of high 
crime rates and the acknowledged limitations of the criminal justice state’ (2001: 105-6). The 
government response to this predicament has resulted in a series of policies that are highly 
contradictory. Garland notes that on the one hand the state appears to be attempting to reclaim 
the power of sovereign command by the use of phrases like ‘zero tolerance’, ‘prison works’, 
                                                 
4 In this study we decided that a ‘targeted surveillance’ had taken place when the CCTV operators held 
a camera on a ‘suspect’ for 30 seconds or more.  
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‘tough on crime’, and ‘three strikes’. However, at the same time there has been an attempt to 
face up to the predicament and develop new pragmatic ‘adaptive’ strategies including the 
‘rationalization of justice’, the ‘commercialization of justice’ and a ‘redistribution’ of the 
responsibility for crime control (2001: 113). It seems to us that however one interprets these 
developments, one of the main reasons for CCTVs rise to ubiquity in the UK is because it 
straddles these conflicting discourses on crime control: on the one hand, the ‘sovereign state’ 
approach with its ‘expressive’ gestures and ‘punitive’ sentiments, and on the other, the 
‘adaptive’ strategies with their emphasis on ‘prevention’ and ‘partnership’.  
 
Expressive gestures 
The first major expansion of open-street CCTV systems in the UK came in 1993 (see Bulos 
and Sarno 1994) after the tragic murder of the toddler Jamie Bulger by two ten-year-old 
schoolboys. The images of the little boy being led from the shopping centre were replayed 
night after night on television and dramatically launched CCTV into the public debate 
surrounding the control of crime. The Bulger case saw the return of openly avowed 
expressions of vengeful sentiment as angry mobs took to the streets demanding that 
something be done. The case also received enormous attention and dominated the headlines 
of both print and electronic media for many weeks.5 The media attention gave an almost 
irresistible impetus to the introduction of CCTV and in July 1994, less than a year after the 
case, a large-scale CCTV system ‘went live’ in the town centre of Liverpool.6 In this context, 
the rapid introduction of surveillance cameras can be seen as a form of ‘acting out - a mode 
that is concerned not so much with controlling crime as with expressing the anger and outrage 
that crime provokes’ (Garland 2001: 110). It was a populist measure designed to send a 
message to the public that the government was doing something about the crime problem. It 
reasserted the old myth of the sovereign state and its plenary power to punish. This was 
                                                 
5 ‘For Goodness Sake Hold Tight to Your Kids’ (The Sun, 16 February 1993).  
6 While the case originally provoked anger at the inadequacy of the fuzzy recorded images, once these 
had been subject to computer enhancement claims were made in the press that they had ‘been a vital 
and unexpected source of information in the investigation of James’s murder’ (Kember 1995: 120). 
 7
reflected in the language of politicians who claimed that CCTV was a ‘friendly eye in the 
sky’ that will ‘put criminals on the run’. Moreover, unlike offender-centred approaches which 
take place away from the public gaze in prisons, drug rehabilitation centres and young 
offender institutions, CCTV is highly visible. The cameras are on the streets for all to see and 
the public are constantly reminded of their presence by a local media hungry for a ‘good news 
story’ which can be dramatically visualised through the use of recorded images from the 
CCTV footage (McCahill 2003). Politicians at both the national and local level are also eager 
to be associated with the introduction of new CCTV systems. Thus while it is unusual to find 
politicians boasting about the introduction of prisons or half-way houses for young offenders 
into the neighbourhood, when it comes to CCTV they are queuing up to be associated with 
this ‘wonderful new technology’ (Norris and Armstrong 1999).  
 
Adaptive strategies 
Running alongside the ‘sovereign state’ approach are a series of more pragmatic statements 
that are less bullish about the possibility of winning the ‘war against crime’. For instance, in 
1993 the Audit Commission published a report that was scathing about the inability of the 
police to stem rising crime rates. It stated, given current trends in crime figures and clear-ups, 
by 2002 the number of recorded crimes will have exceeded 9 million and the overall clear up 
rate could drop to 18% (Audit Commission 1993: 8-9). Worried that society was in danger of 
losing the ‘battle against crime’, the Commission called for a massive expansion of proactive, 
intelligence-led policing, and singled out CCTV as having a major role to play in crime 
prevention. The idea that the government was beginning to acknowledge the limits of the 
sovereign state in the area of crime control are also evident in government-initiated 
‘responsibilization’ strategies which increasingly are addressed not to central-state agencies 
such as the police, ‘but beyond the state apparatus, to the organisations, institutions and 
individuals in civil society’ (Garland 1996: 451; O’Malley 1992). Once again, the rapid 
growth in the use of CCTV surveillance systems would appear to fit neatly with such 
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developments. In 1994 the Conservative government announced the first of four CCTV 
Challenge Competitions to support the expansion of open-street city centre CCTV. Bids had 
to be in the form of a partnership with matched funding from other sources particularly the 
business sector, the local authority, the police or even other Government Agencies. The 
competition would only fund up to 50% of the total capital costs and no contribution would 
be made for the annual running costs which could be as much as £250,000 (Webster 1998). In 
this respect, the introduction of CCTV devolved the responsibility for crime control on to 
local partnerships and dovetailed neatly with the governments ideological demands for 
privatisation of the public sector. These developments have continued under ‘New Labour’ 
where the use of partnerships in the delivery of CCTV has become entrenched in the Crime 
and Disorder Act and Home Office funding mechanisms (Webster 2004). Despite this 
proliferation in the use of surveillance cameras, we still know very little about the exact 
number of cameras currently operating in this country. In the following section we draw upon 
our empirical research to extrapolate the extent of CCTV in London and the country as a 
whole.  
 
CCTV in London 
 
The original catalyst for CCTV expansion in central London came in 1993 in response to the 
IRA’s terrorist attack on Bishopgate. Following this a network of cameras was introduced to 
monitor the entrances to the City of London known as the ‘ring of steel’; a symbolic gesture 
designed both to reassert the power of ‘sovereign command’ and to reassure international 
finance about the security of the city. This system was soon integrated with many of the 
cameras operating in the City’s banks and offices. ‘Camerawatch’, as it is known, was set up 
following a meeting with some 400 organisations and involves 373 systems with over 1200 
cameras (CCTV Today 1995: 28). Meanwhile, the number of open-street CCTV systems 
operating throughout London has grown dramatically following the success of London 
Boroughs in the bidding process for centrally funded CCTV. For example, in the second 
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round of the Crime Reduction Programme (announced on 31 March 2000) awards amounting 
to £79 million were made to partnerships. The successful partnerships included a total of 22 
London Boroughs who made bids ranging from £15,000 in the Borough of Merton to 
£2,718,450 in the Borough of Tower Hamlets (for improvements to the Docklands Light 
Railway). Between them the 22 London boroughs bid for a total of £17,883,343.  
 
CCTV in a South London Borough  
To get a more precise account of the use of CCTV in publicly accessible spaces in London we 
conducted two surveys in a South London Borough. In our first survey of commercial/civic 
(publicly accessible) institutions we found that out of a total of 27 public institutions fifteen 
(56%) had a CCTV system in operation7. We obtained information on the number of cameras 
from fourteen institutions. Between them these premises had a total of 127 CCTV cameras. 
On average there were nine cameras per institution. In our High Street survey, we identified 
217 publicly accessible premises. These included seventy-six (35%) chain stores, forty-eight 
(22%) small shops and 41 (19%) eating/drinking places. In total ninety-two premises 
appeared to have cameras. However, in six of these cases these were ‘dummy’ cameras. Thus, 
86 (41%) out of 211 of the institutions in our sample had CCTV systems in operation. Our 
sample gained information on the number of cameras in 60 of the 86 institutions with CCTV 
systems. In total, there were 246 CCTV cameras in our High Street sample. The average 
number of cameras in these institutions was 4.1.  
 
What do our surveys tell us about the extent of CCTV in London? We can see from our High 
Street sample, that 41% of premises had CCTV systems in operation and that the average 
number of cameras per institution with CCTV was 4.1. If we begin by assuming that the 
                                                 
7 The hospital, public school, social welfare/benefits office, unemployment office, metro/underground, 
car park, shopping mall, chain store, pharmacy, bank, post office, hotel, cinema, petrol station, and pub 
all had a CCTV system. However, the kindergarten, college/university, court, leisure centre, public 
library, church, cemetery, public toilet, small shop, restaurant, park and high-density residential area 
did not have CCTV systems. 
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extent of CCTV coverage in our sample is broadly representative of CCTV coverage across 
the whole of London, we can estimate that 41% (102,910) of the 251,000 businesses 
registered for VAT in London8 would have a CCTV system. Between them these businesses 
will have 421,931 surveillance cameras. If we add to these the number of surveillance 
cameras operating in other public institutions (open-street systems, transport, hospital, schools 
etc.) it would not be unreasonable to ‘guesstimate’ that Londoners are monitored by at least 
500,000 CCTV cameras. This would mean that in London (with a population of 7.2 million 
residents) there may be as many as one camera for every fourteen people. Tentatively, 
extrapolating these figures to the UK as a whole there may now be some 4.2 million 
surveillance cameras in operation.  
 
While our surveys may give us an indication of the ubiquity of CCTV in London, we cannot 
make any generalisations about the nature and impact of CCTV from the mere existence of 
these systems. For instance, the majority of systems in both our samples are small operations 
with very little technological or organizational sophistication. In our High Street sample forty-
five out of fifty-nine (76%) institutions had fixed cameras only, thirty-six out of fifty (72%) 
systems were monitored by a single person, thirty-eight out of forty-nine (78%) were 
monitored ‘irregularly’, and only five (10%) systems were monitored on a continuous basis 
(i.e. 24 hours a day/7days a week). Similarly, in terms of system integration with outside 
agencies only 2 (3%) institutions had the facility to relay pictures captured by their system to 
the police, and less than a third (29%) had electronic communications links with other 
police/security systems (see McCahill and Norris 2003: 62-3).  
 
Inside the CCTV control rooms 
 
                                                 
8 See London Research Centre (2000), Focus on London 2000, London: The Stationary Office. 
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Based on our High Street sample of CCTV systems there would appear to be very little scope 
for proactive surveillance carried out in conjunction with the police. However, as part of our 
comparative research for the URBANEYE project, we also looked at the ‘practice of video 
surveillance’ in several major institutions with more (technologically and organisationally) 
sophisticated CCTV networks. These included firstly, a local authority controlled open-street 
CCTV system in a South London Borough with a network of approximately 250 cameras 
located to monitor the borough’s five town centres and public housing areas. Secondly, a 
mainline railway company with a network of 1,385 (mainly fixed) CCTV cameras situated to 
monitor the entrances and exits, ticket machines, barrier gates, and Help Points in sixty-five 
train stations. Thirdly, West London Mall which has a brand new digital CCTV system 
consisting of 75 CCTV cameras (50 ‘pan/tilt/zoom’ and 25 ‘fixed’ cameras). And finally, 
South London Mall, a 1960’s building in a busy shopping district with a small system 
consisting of fourteen cameras which monitor the malls, the entrance points, the lifts and five 
service yard areas.  
 
From normalisation to risk management 
Several Security Managers explained how their CCTV systems were used in a ‘proactive’ 
way to monitor geographical spaces, time periods, and categories of people rather than 
individual suspects. In our public CCTV network of 250 cameras in a South London Borough, 
many of the cameras were placed strategically to target particular spaces, as the Borough’s 
Crime Watch Manager explained: 
 
The five areas are our main shopping parades. They also happen to be where the majority of the rail and bus 
interchanges are. So it’s the five areas in the borough that have the highest concentration of what you call non-
resident public conglomerations of people coming together for whatever reason, be it shopping, be it commuting, 
be it just travelling through one place to another. So the five areas are where CCTV is most needed and most likely 
to be effective (Crime Watch Manager).  
 
 12
At London Trains 131 train stations have CCTV systems in operation. The images from 623 
CCTV cameras (out of a total of 1,385) are relayed back to a central control room that 
displays the images on a bank of 33 monitors. One of the main uses of the system on this site 
is to monitor specific time periods when large congregations of people are in the stations. As 
the Control Centre Manager explained: 
 
When Twickenham (an international rugby match) is on we can get over-crowding and safety problems. You could 
have 2,000 people trying to get on the platform at once. So we liase with the platform staff and get them to limit 
the number of people coming into the station or close the station ... Also at 3.30pm we have ‘schools out’, you 
know, Monday to Friday when there’s a lot kids in the station. 
 
Meanwhile, at West London Mall a brand new digital CCTV system consisting of 75 CCTV 
cameras is used mainly to deal with ‘categories’ of people who disrupt the commercial image: 
 
The main problems encountered on the malls stem from groups of youths congregating and generally 
causing a nuisance ... Should anyone be banned from the centre this information is relayed through 
the shifts so that all security officers on the malls are aware of who is and isn’t banned (Operations 
Manager).  
 
As the above quotation illustrates, the growth of CCTV in semi-public spaces brings with it 
an increasing emphasis on exclusion as the dominant strategy of social control. At West 
London Mall information on ‘banning orders’ was relayed through the shifts so that all 
security officers knew who was banned. The exclusionary potential of CCTV was also 
evident at South London Mall which has a battered old system consisting of fourteen 
cameras (eight internal cameras and six external cameras).  South London Mall was built in 
the late 1960’s and is only a short walk from some very affluent housing. However, there 
are also pockets of extreme deprivation nearby. One of the primary functions of the security 
system on this site was, from the Marketing Executives point of view, to monitor certain 
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‘categories’ of people while at the same time attracting other categories of people (i.e. more 
affluent consumers) to the mall: 
 
We’ve got around 500 residents in these blocks in total [there are several blocks of high-rise council flats on the 
premises of South London Mall]. We look at them as sort of our core catchment really in so much as they’re the 
immediate catchment. But they’re not really a sustainable catchment because they’re fairly low income … If you 
actually look at the over all demographics of the Borough, on the east and west sides of the high street it’s very 
affluent. You’ve got high percentages of A’s, B’s and C1’s,9 the more affluent socio-economic groups, and you’ve 
got lower percentages of C2’s, D’s and E’s - much lower than the national average … What we tend to find from a 
marketing point of view where you have a mass of people that are primarily D-E spectrum and you have mass of 
people that are sort of A, B, C1, the D’s and E’s are quite territorial and what they try to do is because they are 
quite loud and quite aggressive they tend to sort of push out the A’s and B’s. Now unless the mass of A’s and B’s 
is large enough to sort of maintain their status, they tend to be sort of pushed out. So the area, although it is 
predominantly A, B, C1 (you might have a lower amount of D’s and E’s) because they’re so loud and aggressive 
they tend to push out the A’s and B’s. So you end up with a nightmare situation, and it’s only policeable by 
security and CCTV. 
 
One problem with these practices, as von Hirsch and Shearing (2000: 90) have argued, 
‘relates to the possible unfairness of the procedure for determining that a criminal violation 
has occurred’. On some occasions, for example, it appeared that exclusionary practices at 
South London Mall were based more on the whim of the security officers than on the 
behaviour of those who were ejected. As one CCTV operator put it when asked if a suspect 
was banned, ‘if he’s looking really scruffy or he’s drunk, then we throw him out of the 
centre’. The use of these practices represents a shift from formal and legally regulated 
measures of crime control and order maintenance towards private and unaccountable justice.  
 
Policing ‘beyond-the-state’ 
Our interviews with system mangers also revealed that the development of CCTV networks in 
London is giving rise to new forms of ‘hybrid policing’ which blur the boundaries between 
                                                 
9 Here the Marketing Executive is referring to the ‘ABC1’ scale of social stratification.  
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‘public’ and ‘private’ policing. For instance, the CCTV operators (a combination of Local 
Authority employees and the police) in our public CCTV network have a Retail Radio Link 
which allows them to communicate with private security officers working in 175 businesses 
(around 35 in each of the borough’s five town centres) throughout the Borough. Also on the 
Retail Radio system are the borough’s Street Patrollers who have the power to enforce local 
bylaws.  Meanwhile the images displayed on the screens in the council’s CCTV control room 
can be relayed to three local police stations. Similarly, the CCTV operators at London Trains 
have a radio handset that allows them to communicate with some of the retailers in the local 
town centre. As the Security Manager explains, ‘basically, what happens is if someone steals 
something from Marks and Spencer’s they can get on the radio and say, “we’ve had someone 
in our shop stealing and they’re heading towards the train station, this is what they look 
like”’. On this site, there is also close liaison between the CCTV operators and the police as 
the Security Manager explained: ‘the police request videos all the time. I’d say we hand over 
about 150 tapes per month to the police to do with instances on the stations or near the 
stations’ (Security Manager).  
 
There is, therefore, an increasing tendency for CCTV systems to become embedded in a 
complex social and technological web of surveillance that extends and diffuses the impact of 
the surveillance gaze to a range of other control agencies. In this respect, ‘new modes of 
government’ are not simply about the central state off-loading the responsibility for crime 
control. Instead, the composition of such networks can in some contexts extend the central 
state’s capacity for action and influence (Garland 1996). In his book, The Surveillance Web, 
for example, McCahill showed how the privately owned CCTV control room of a local 
shopping mall was used by the police as an ‘intelligence base’ to target suspected drug dealers.  
 
Neither does the development of policing ‘beyond-the-state’ lead to the demise of the 
‘normalizing’ strategies associated with Old Penology. For instance, police use of ‘semi-
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private’ CCTV systems often involves the targeting of ‘suspected’ or ‘known’ individuals’ so 
that they can be arrested and punished: 
 
One major problem with not having the police [in the control room] would be not having police intelligence. 
The police know who they’re looking for. They’ve got people who they’re looking for even before they’ve done 
something (Crime Watch Manager, South London Borough).  
 
We’ve got a problem with ‘ticket touts’ and ‘aggressive beggars’ at [one station]. You can see we’ve got three 
cameras on there at the moment. The police ask us to monitor and pass on information, and we’ve had ASBO’s 
[Anti Social Behaviour Orders] issued against known people (Control Centre Manager, London Trains).   
 
The police use the system a lot. There was a bank hold-up a few weeks ago and the police had a suspect who 
they had been told used the mall and so they sat in the control room to see if they could identify them (Duty 
Manager, West London Mall).  
 
We can see here not the replacement of the Old Penology with a New Penology but their 
fusion. While there is clearly a concern with groups and categories, with pro-active targeting 
and the expansion of non-state forms of surveillance, simultaneously we see a concern with 
identifying known individuals and the co-option of private systems for the purposes of state 
policing. However, as we show below in our case study of a London Shopping Mall, the 
incorporation of commercial security into policing networks is by no means straightforward.  
 
CCTV Operators in a London Shopping Mall 
 
As a number of writers have shown, the operation and impact of CCTV systems has to be 
understood as the outcome of the complex interplay between technological, organisational 
and cultural factors (Norris and Armstrong 1999; McCahill 2002). For instance, in his study 
of the use of CCTV in shopping malls and the industrial work place, McCahill (2002) found 
that the ability of system managers to mobilise a response to monitored non-compliance was 
constrained by local cultural traditions and class solidarities amongst low-level security 
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officers who often identified more with those under surveillance than with their superiors. In 
this section we draw upon 120 hours of observational research conducted at South London 
Mall to show how the operational procedures of CCTV control rooms are shaped not only by 
cultural traditions and organisational practices, but also by the individual concerns of those 
working within the same organisation. In particular, we want to look at how the ideas of 
‘partnership’ and ‘prevention’ are mediated by those responsible for monitoring the systems. 
When we do this we find that the idea of a ‘post-modern’ or ‘late-modern’ penality begins to 
unravel. 
 
South London Mall is situated in a town centre in South London and is surrounded by a 
number of high-rise council flats the occupants of which make up the shopping mall’s main 
clientele. The first cameras were installed in the 1980’s and the system has been up-dated 
periodically with, for example, the introduction of dome cameras. There are eight internal 
cameras (a combination of pan/tilt/zoom and dome cameras) situated to monitor the malls, the 
entrance points and the lifts, and six external cameras (five pan/tilt/zoom and one fixed) used 
to monitor the entrance points to the shopping malls five service yard areas. The control room 
is manned for 24 hours a day, 365 days a year by security officers (seven Black, one Asian 
and two White operatives) employed by a UK private security company. In theory everything 
on this site was in place for ‘proactive’ or ‘pre-emptive’ policing conducted in close co-
operation with the police. The CCTV operators in the control room had the facility to pull 
down images from the councils’ network of 250 CCTV cameras on to a TV monitor. There 
was a retail radio link that allowed the CCTV operators to communicate with the police and 
other security officers working in the town centre. Also, police officers based in the local 
Crime Prevention Shop (located in the mall) had been given a radio handset that allowed them 
to communicate with security officers during unfolding incidents. However, as we shall see 
below, organisational conflict and low staff morale had a major impact on the way the system 
worked in practice.  
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Organisational conflict and the limits of ‘partnership’ 
One of the most important determinants of surveillance practice on this site was the level of 
conflict within the organisation. Conflict between the security officers and the management, 
for example, was intense. During our brief spell in the control room one guard was dismissed, 
two were demoted (moved from the mall to service yard duty), two received written warnings, 
and there were several disputes over pay, all of which generated a hostile atmosphere in the 
control room. The general mood amongst the officers is summed up in the following 
statement:  
 
Extract from fieldnotes: This company is shit man. They don’t care about us, they don’t do anything for us. I’ve 
done so much for this company. They’ve rang me at twelve at night and asked me if I could work and I’ve said, 
‘yes, no problem’. And the staff here don’t give a shit. They’re all lethargic and lazy; they’re not on the ball. We 
(Tarrik and Harry) used to come in here on our night off and help out the night staff. I came in here the other 
night because I’d left something in my locker and X was asleep down there, Y was asleep over there, and Z was 
bringing his TV upstairs. And none of these guys are trained. They don’t give a fuck. I’ve done my Sito, Health 
and Safety, Fire Procedures, People Management, the lot man. When the old security manager was here it was 
really good, you know. He put me through all the proper training courses. But Stephen hasn’t got a fucking clue. 
 
Organisational conflict also existed between the security officers and the police. Some 
security officers, for example, had ‘out-of-work’ problems with the police. During one shift 
Graham was very annoyed about the treatment he received after a minor car accident: 
 
Extract from field notes: When the police arrived they checked my car very thoroughly man. They looked at the 
foot pedals and tyres but never bothered to check the other vehicle. They asked me to perform a breathalyser test 
and started to ask me stupid questions. They said “how long have you lived in this country?” So I said, “how 
long have you been in this job?” But they said nothing to the other guy. Then they said, “what year were you 
born?” So I told them and they said “so how old are you?” So I said, “didn’t you go to school? Don’t you know 
mathematics? Stop asking me stupid questions” And then I said, “go on arrest me; put handcuffs on me”’.  
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Other security officers had experienced ‘on-the-job’ trouble with local police officers. For 
instance, the TV monitor that allowed the security officers to relay pictures from the council’s 
open-street CCTV system was removed because, as one of the security officers explained, 
‘some of the guards were being a bit naughty and miss-using the cameras so they took it down. 
You know, watching things they were not supposed to be watching; girls walking down the 
street and things like that’ (Security Officer). Tensions between the security team and the 
police came to a head when Tarrik was arrested for assaulting a police officer. One Saturday 
afternoon, a fight broke out on the mall. A man had stolen a mobile phone; it turns out from 
his girlfriend. When confronted by several guards the man began to lash out. In the ensuing 
melee the suspect managed to head butt Graham (security guard) and land a right hook on 
Tarrik’s chin. Following this Tarrik grabbed hold of the man and repeatedly smashed his face 
down on his knee. When describing the incident in the control room Tarrik told me that he 
took great care to ensure that the mans face was landing right on the end of his knee cap, 
rather than on the softer area just above the knee. There are conflicting views about what 
happened next. Harry says that during the fight a police officer from the Crime Prevention 
Shop in the mall tried to intervene and as Tarrik pulled his arm back to lay another punch, his 
elbow hit the police officer in the mouth and knocked out a couple of his teeth. Following this 
the police officer stood back and shouted ‘ASSAULT’! ‘So the man on the mall who had 
assaulted three guards’, Harry says, ‘walked off and the police came and arrested Tarrik’.  
 
As one can imagine, these developments were not entirely conducive to the formation of a 
‘partnership’ approach to crime prevention. For instance, following Tarrik’s arrest the 
security team removed a radio hand-set (which allowed the police to listen to the security 
officers on the shopping mall radio link) from the Crime Prevention Shop to stop them from 
‘interfering’ during incidents that take place on the mall. Tensions between the security team 
and the police were also having an impact on operational procedures, as the following 
incident illustrates:  
 
 19
Targeted Surveillance 1 (Shift 6 at 12.00-suspect not identified) 
At 12.00 Darren (the main CCTV operator on duty today) has gone for a break and Harry and Tarrik are sitting 
at the control desk. They receive a message on the shopping mall radio link from the ‘Crime Shop’ (police): 
‘Control we’ve just had a radio message from WH Smiths that two IC 3 males have been acting suspiciously in 
their shop. One of them is wearing jeans and a black baseball cap…’ Harry interrupts before hearing the end of 
the message: ‘WH Smiths have got their own security’, and then, on the radio says, ‘yes, received Crime Shop’. 
No attempt is made to find the suspects on camera.  
 
During another incident Harry spotted a suspect on camera placing a knife up his sleeve. 
When the police used their radio to ask Misha (female security officer) if she was okay, Harry, 
on the radio, said, ‘Yea, Crime Prevention can you keep out of this please?’ When they 
continued to interject on the radio Harry snapped, ‘Crime Prevention can you shut up?’  
 
Mediating the image - the limits of ‘proactive’ surveillance 
For CCTV systems to operate in a way that reflects the aims of the ‘new penology’ we would 
expect those working in the control rooms to use the system ‘proactively’ to prevent crimes 
from occurring in the first place. However, the main theme to emerge from our observational 
analysis was the extremely low level of ‘proactive’ use of the CCTV system by front-line 
operators. For instance, our findings showed that in 120 hours of observation there were just 
84 ‘targeted surveillance’s’. This represented just over five targeted surveillances per eight-
hour shift. Moreover, only 29 (35%) of these were the result of ‘proactive’ use of the system 
by CCTV operators. In other words, there was a proactive CCTV operator-initiated targeted 
surveillance in this control room once every four hours (two per eight-hour shift). 
 
The lack of proactive use of the CCTV system on this site was partly due to the high level of 
organisational conflict that produced a divided and disillusioned work force. The 
disillusionment amongst the guards was reflected in their use, or rather non-use, of the CCTV 
system. During shift one, for example, Harry saw what he described as a ‘known shoplifter’ 
but didn’t bother following him. On another occasion he saw a man leaving the mall with 
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stolen books but didn’t bother to deploy a security officer because he thought there was not 
enough staff on duty. On another occasion he tried to contact a guard but on receiving a 
muffled and incomprehensible response in broken English threw down his radio in disgust. 
During another incident Harry tried frantically to deploy one of the guards to a shop that had 
been burgled at the back entrance. However, after making six or seven attempts to contact a 
security officer Harry got so fed up that he decided to deploy himself to the scene leaving the 
control room ‘un-manned’ for fifteen minutes.  
 
A Typology of CCTV operators 
A combination of intense organisational conflict and weak management structure meant that 
operational procedures were left almost entirely in the hands of the security officers. However, 
not all security officers responded in the same way to this situation. In the Table 1 we have 
adapted Robert Merton’s (1938) famous typology in an attempt to examine the orientation of 
different security officers to their job. First, we have the ‘technophile-work embracer’ who 
accepts both the organisational goals and the technological means of achieving those goals. 
Second, is the ‘technophobe-work avoider’ who rejects both the organisational goals and the 
technological means of achieving those goals. Third, is the ‘technophobe-work embracer’ 
who is committed to the organisational goals but rejects the technological means of achieving 
them. Finally, we have the ‘technophile-work avoider’ who rejects the organisational goals 
but accepts the technological means of achieving them (or has a level of technological 
sophistication required to achieve the organisational goals if he or she wished to pursue them). 
Table 1 
A typology of CCTV operators/security officers 
 
     Organisational Goals  Techno Means 
Technophile-work embracer (conformist)  +    + 
Technophobe-work avoider (drop out)  -    - 
Technophobe-work-embracer (innovator)  +    - 
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Technophile-work-avoider (ritualist)  -    + 
 
The technophile-work embracer: Harry is a 24-year-old white male who has worked at the 
shopping mall for around four years. Harry, who was formerly employed as the Security 
Manager of the mall, is the most experienced and knowledgeable of all the security officers. 
In terms of technological sophistication, Harry is easily the most experienced guard. He is 
very quick and efficient when using the control panel and he knows how to programme the 
cameras, change default positions, take hard copy print outs etc. In terms of organisational 
goals, Harry is basically a ‘crime fighter’. He was the only security officer who managed to 
spot offences in progress on the CCTV system including a man trying to put a book in his 
inside jacket pocket, a teenager putting a knife up his sleeve, and two boys stealing what he 
thought were DVD’s. However, he also uses ‘economic’ forms of reasoning (Garland, 2001), 
choosing to monitor ‘vulnerable’ targets and ‘time periods’ rather than individual suspects:  
 
Targeted Surveillance 2 (Shift 3: 11.45-11.46): 
At 11.45 Harry is in the control room and is using one of the internal dome cameras to zoom in the doorway of 
Basic Clothes (clothes shop). He sees a white male in his early forties looking at three-quarter length suede coats. 
As Harry watches the man trying on one of the coats he says, ‘this time of year everyone nicks coats ‘cos they’re 
expensive you know’.   
 
Targeted Surveillance (less than 30 seconds and suspect not identified) 
Harry zooms in on Boots the Chemist and tells me that it was usually a good idea to monitor those shops selling 
sandwiches across dinnertime. 
 
The technophobe-work avoider: The technophobe-work avoider is epitomised by Winston. 
Winston is a Jamaican in his early forties. He spends more time in the local bookmakers 
trying to back a winner than he does on the mall trying to catch the criminals. Moreover, on 
the rare occasion he does come to the control room he lacks the technological sophistication 
required to use the system effectively: 
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Targeted Surveillance 4 (Shift 11 at 16.18 – not identified) 
At 16.18 Winston is sitting at the control desk when the telephone rings: 
Winston (on the telephone): ‘Hello, South London Mall how can I help you? Erm, he’s er, he’s er, not in er at 
the moment. Okay, no problem. Er, what I’ll do…’ (while Winston is talking on the telephone he receives a 
message on the radio from one of the patrol guards). 
Romeo 17: ‘Romeo 17 to control over’. 
Winston (on the telephone): ‘Can you er hold the line please?’ And then, on the hands-free receiver, Winston 
says, ‘Stand by control (Winston is in the control room). Sorry, stand by Romeo seventeen’. 
Winston (on the telephone): ‘I’ll get him to call you back okay?’ 
Winston (on the hands-free receiver): ‘Come in seventeen’. 
Romeo 17: ‘Control a small girl has been mugged. She has had her mobile stolen outside the ‘Snoozestore’ 
over’. 
The telephone rings again and a buzzer for one of the five intercom phones goes off. Winston picks up the 
intercom receiver for the F Service Yard area: ‘Hello security’. There is no reply because Winston has picked up 
the wrong receiver. He tries again on the receiver for E Service Yard: ‘hello security. Okay’, he says, as he 
reaches for the button to open the gate for E Service Yard.  
 
In the incident above Winston stammers on the telephone, grabs the wrong intercom receiver, 
and on the hands-free receiver says, ‘stand by control’ when he was addressing a guard on the 
mall. Winston is rarely on the mall when needed and when he comes to the control room 
operational procedures quickly descend into chaos. During another incident Winston contacts 
the control room because he is concerned about the behaviour of a group of boys: 
 
Targeted Surveillance 3 (Shift 4 at 10.18 – not identified)  
At 10.18 Winston calls Tim in the control room: 
Romeo 4: Control there’s a group of IC 1 males causing trouble on the South Mall’. 
Tim: ‘Yes, what are they actually doing Romeo four, are they just messing about?’ 
Romeo 4: ‘Actually, it’s a… it’s a lot more than that control. They’re throwing stuff around and it’s getting out 
of control, control over’. 
Tim: ‘Okay, I’ll keep the cameras on them’. 
Romeo 4 to Misha (patrol guard on the mall): ‘Romeo 5 can you keep those kids out?’ 
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Misha: ‘Romeo 4, I spoke to them earlier they’re just kids, they’re okay’. 
 
In the incident above neither Tim (CCTV operator in the control room) nor Misha (patrol 
guard on the mall) take Winston’s concern seriously. Winston is a ‘technophobe-work 
avoider’ who is never around when trouble commences. When he sends messages to the 
control room, therefore, his colleagues question his judgement as to the seriousness of the 
unfolding incident.  
 
The technophobe-work embracer: Misha is the only female security officer at the shopping 
mall. Born in Morocco she speaks in broken English and has lived in the local flats for eight 
years. Misha has previously worked as a security officer for two national retail stores on 
Oxford Street. During one very brief stint at the control desk she told me that the security 
system at one of these stores was excellent and that I should have carried out my study there 
instead of the ‘rubbish system’ at South London Mall. I ask her about her experiences on the 
mall and she says, ‘If you treat the people here with respect then they’ll respect you. I live on 
the estate you know, so they know me and they respect me’. Misha, unlike most of the guards, 
takes her job very seriously and is very conscientious. The other guards often rib her because 
of this. Graham, for example, describes her as ‘fussy’. On one occasion Misha was due to 
finish at four o’clock. She arrived in the control room at five to four to collect some things but 
refused to leave until the clock struck four. Winston, who was sitting at the control desk, said 
‘leave now Misha, don’t be a chicken’.  
 
While Misha was very committed to her job, she hated working in the CCTV control room. 
As she explained, ‘people don’t understand me (on the telephone and intercom) so they 
always ask me to repeat things. And they take advantage because I’m a foreigner’. Misha’s 
dislike of working in the control room was so intense that on one occasion when called to the 
control room she stood at the doorway and refused to enter:  
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At 15.00 Graham calls Misha to the control room. When Misha arrives she finds that Graham has sneaked out to 
an area at the back of the control room to make a telephone call on his mobile phone. ‘I’m not staying in here’, 
Misha shouts to Graham as she stands at the entrance to the control room refusing to sit at the desk. As I sit in 
the control room on my own several requests for access to the service yard areas are made via the intercom 
systems. Misha walks into the control room, presses one of the buttons to raise the access control barriers and 
then walks out and resumes her position by the entrance to the control room. As Misha enters once again to 
answer the telephone, Graham returns but quickly leaves again when he receives another call on his mobile 
telephone. As Graham heads towards the control room exit, Misha grabs her things and sprints out of the control 
room. As she runs for the door she shouts to Graham, ‘don’t you leave me in here!’ 
 
The technophile-work avoider: Darren is the security teams second Supervisor. He is in his 
mid-forties, married with four children, and speaks in a thick Jamaican accent. Having 
worked at the mall for around ten years, Darren is one of the more experienced officers. 
However, although he has a high level of technological sophistication he very rarely uses the 
CCTV system in a proactive way, relying instead on incidents to be called to his attention by 
the security officers who patrolled the mall. He spends most his time reading tabloid 
newspapers, particularly the horse racing section: 
 
Shift 5: Monday 21 October 2002 
I arrive in the control room at 09.00 on Monday morning to begin a very uneventful day. Darren is back from his 
two-week holidays and spends most of the day reading his newspapers. The CCTV system is not used proactively 
during the entire eight-hour shift. Darren sat for what seemed like hours at the control desk and at one point it 
looked like his head was nodding and it sounded like he was snoring. During these long periods of inactivity he 
was occasionally brought to attention by the buzzing sounds of the intercom systems, and, startled, he would reach 
across the control desk to press a button to open the remotely operated access control gates to allow vehicles into 
the shopping malls delivery areas. 
 
When an incident is brought to the attention of the CCTV operator from someone outside of 
the system he or she can respond in three ways. Firstly, the CCTV operator can use the 
system to provide information that will help those on the mall during a targeted surveillance. 
Secondly, the CCTV operator may acknowledge the message that has come from outside the 
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system but provides only a ‘tokenistic’ response to the unfolding incident. The third level of 
response to incidents brought to the attention of CCTV operators is no response at all. Here 
incidents are completely ignored regardless of the ‘seriousness’ or ‘urgency’ of the message 
that comes from outside the system. Take Darren’s response in the following incident:  
 
Targeted Surveillance 7 (Shift 9 at 15.07 – not identified) 
At 15.07 Darren is sitting at the control desk with his eyes closed when he receives a call on the Emergency 
Telephone from the ‘Crime Prevention Shop’ concerning two missing boys. He leans forward and presses the 
button on the hands-free receiver: ‘control to all guards. Can you be on the look out for two IC3 males? If you 
see them can you take them to Crime Prevention?’ Darren sits back in his chair and makes no attempt to find the 
two boys on camera. Out of the four guards on the mall, only Misha responds to his message. A couple of 
minutes later an urgent sounding message comes across on the radio from Stephen, the Senior Contracts 
Manager, who is on the mall: ‘Control, Charlie Mike speaking. Could you and all guards look out for two IC3 
boys? One of them is wearing blue trousers and a purple top. The mother is very distraught’. Once again, only 
Misha responds to this message and Darren makes no attempt to find the boys on camera.  
 
At 15.21 Stephen contacts the control room on the radio link: ‘control and all stations. We’ve found 
the two boys over’. 
Darren: ‘yes, received that’.  
 
As our typology shows there is a wide variation in the extent to which individuals except or 
reject organisational goals and the technological means of achieving those goals. For instance, 
one of the main reasons for ‘non-use’ of the system is that Darren, the shopping mall’s main 
CCTV operator, is a ‘technophile-work avoider’. During the period of observation, Darren sat 
at the control desk during thirteen of the fifteen eight hour shifts. However, he was only 
responsible for 4 (14%) of the 29 targeted surveillances initiated by a CCTV operator. During 
the period of observation Darren was relieved periodically for breaks usually by Harry who is 
the other main CCTV operator. Harry, as we know, was a ‘technophile-work embracer’ or 
‘crime fighter’ who used the system proactively. Thus although Harry only sat at the control 
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desk while Darren took his breaks, he was responsible for 22 (76%) of the 29 targeted 
surveillances initiated by a CCTV operator.  
 
Of course, it may be that in time the concerns of particular individuals become subsumed by 
the general ‘occupational culture’ of the organisation. If this is the case, it may be that the 
whole work force eventually falls into line behind the dominant organisational and 
occupational ethos of ‘crime fighting’ or ‘work avoidance’. At South London Mall, for 
example, it became clear towards the end of the period of observation that Harry 
(‘technophile-work embracer’) and Misha (‘technophobe-work embracer’) were becoming 
increasingly disillusioned with their jobs. By the end of the period of observation Misha 
expressed a desire to leave the mall, while Harry began to arrive late for work. Moreover, 
when Harry did arrive he usually read the newspaper and began to visit the Health Centre 
during working hours. He even joined Darren in the bookies on one or two occasions. In other 
words, Harry became a ‘technophile-work avoider’. This may be only temporary though, 
because he is planning to leave the mall to become a real ‘crime fighter’ when he joins the 
Metropolitan Police Force.  
 
As our case studies show, the issue of whether visual surveillance systems mirror the 
principles of New or Old Penology in their operation and effects is highly context dependent. 
At South London Trains, for example, a combination of railway employees and police 
officers used the system in a ‘pro-active’ way to monitor specific time periods and ‘flows’ of 
people. In stark contrast, at South London Mall the technological infrastructure introduced to 
facilitate co-operation between the police and private security officers was eventually 
dismantled due to intense organisational conflict. Whether the ‘new surveillance’ 
technologies facilitate a pro-active or pre-emptive approach to policing is not only mediated 
by conflicting organisational goals, but also by the individual concerns of those working 
within the same organisation.  
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Conclusion 
 
CCTV sits at the meeting place of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ penology.  From the perspective of 
the new penology the appeal of CCTV is that it facilitates expressive gestures by visibly 
demonstrating that something is being done about crime. CCTV also fits easily with the new 
‘responsibilization strategies’ pursued by the central state which encourages private sector 
involvement in crime control (Johnston and Shearing 2003). This new technology has further 
appeal because it reflects the logic of the ‘new criminology of everyday life’ with its stress on 
the rational actor and situational crime prevention: for ‘situational man’ the deployment of 
CCTV increases the likelihood of being caught and therefore increases the ‘cost’ to the 
offender.  
 
But simultaneously, from the perspective of ‘penal modernism’ or the ‘old penology’, the 
appeal of CCTV is that it represents an extension of state power. As Webster (2004) has 
pointed out:  
Although the emergence of partnerships and co-regulation in the CCTV policy arena point to the growth of an 
independent self-governing network, these developments have been carefully steered and co-ordinated by key 
central government institutions. Crucially, the evolving network relationships have been shaped by powerful 
institutional interests to secure the desired diffusion of the technology. Formal and informal “tools of government” 
have been utilised to ensure that the diffusion of the technology and appropriate networks are in the interests of the 
state (2004: 24-5).  
 
Thus for some writers the development of public-private CCTV surveillance networks is not 
about the state ‘off-loading’ the responsibility for crime control, rather the construction of 
these networks is part of a ‘social ordering strategy’ which augments and extends ‘the 
sovereignty of local and nation-state decision-making structures’ (Coleman, Sim and Whyte 
2002: 96).  Similarly, while the expansion of CCTV in the semi-public space of the mall and 
other retail environments is driven by ‘beyond-the-state’ interests of loss prevention and 
commercial image, these systems can be easily and routinely co-opted for traditional policing. 
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In this respect, the de-regulation and privatisation of crime control provides ‘extra eyes and 
ears for the police’ and extra ‘pieces of evidence for prosecutors’ and what we are witnessing 
‘is a “rolling out” rather than a “rolling back” of the state’ (Hudson .201 156).  But as we saw 
in our case study of South London Mall, even this is contingent upon the interpersonal 
dynamics of local partnerships. 
 
The growth of CCTV may also reflect the increasing importance of the actuarial techniques 
emphasised by the new penology.  Actuarialism promotes a concern with preventing future 
crime rather than managing past crime; it involves the classification of individuals and groups 
as particular bearers of risk who, once identified, can become the target of proactive 
intervention.  In the case of CCTV, proactive targeting by operatives is indeed possible, and 
some have suggested that proactive techniques are reflected in the growth of computer 
simulation whereby software can analyse the flow of digitalised images to plot possible future 
outcomes.  This information can then be used to signal when intervention is necessary, before 
an event takes place  (Graham 1998, Norris 2003). However, proactive monitoring is not an 
inevitable consequence of utilising CCTV, this will depend on the technological 
sophistication of the system and the organisational environment in which it is placed.  Our 
findings show that over two-thirds of systems relied on fixed, rather than pan-tilt and zoom 
cameras, making proactive targeting difficult and less than one in twenty systems recorded 
data in a digital form that would allow computerised analysis of the images. Even where the 
technology does allow operatives to proactively track and target, it is still dependent on the 
organisational context and predilection of individual operatives.  In our study, 120 hours of 
observation yielded only 29 instances of proactive targeting and three quarters of these of 
these were initiated by a single operative  (see also McCahill and Norris 2002 :20). 
 
For the new penologists one of the key shifts marking the break with the old penology is from 
individualised to generalised suspicion.  Since risk is a statistical attribute of populations, it is 
necessary to collate information on the whole population rather than those who are already 
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defined as deviant.  In this way the general diffusion of CCTV reflects this trend as the 
unmediated gaze of the camera monitors the entire population. Although CCTV operators are 
using a ‘post-modern’ technology, they interpret the images on the screen through a mind’s 
eye that is steeped in a modernist conception of crime: operators do not see ‘risk’ or 
‘responsibilization’, they see ‘scrotes’ and ‘scallies’ and people who are ‘out of place’ and 
‘out of time’ (Norris and Armstrong 1999). In practice then the gaze is mediated by the 
selective concerns of the operators and, as studies of the routine operation of control rooms 
have shown, the targeted gaze of CCTV cameras does not fall equally on all sections of the 
population. It is stratified along dimensions of age, ethnicity and gender. Thus than 
representing a radical break with the past, the operation of CCTV merely gives an 
electronically mediated twist to that very old fashioned mantra of ‘round up the usual 
suspects’ (see McCahill and Norris 2002, McCahill 2001, Smith 2004, Lomell  2004, 
Urbaneye 2004).  
 
In line with the Old Penology CCTV can be disciplinary in the sense that it enables capture, 
censure and normalisation of particular offenders.  It is also disciplinary in that it fosters 
‘habituated anticipatory conformity’ by a population that believes it is permanently under 
surveillance.  However, the claim that the growth of CCTV represents a general dispersal of 
discipline through the panopticisation of public space needs to be treated cautiously. Firstly, 
the disciplinary potential of the panopticon, derives not just from the power to observe but in 
the power to classify. In the panopticon observation of a known offender is linked to a unique 
individualised record that forms the basis of classificatory judgement. But CCTV surveillance 
is generally characterised by anonymity; in our study only 6% of observation were based on 
personalised knowledge and similar findings have been reported by Lomell 2004).  Similarly 
CCTV can only foster anticipatory conformity if people are actually aware that they are under 
surveillance. In Glasgow, Ditton’s study found that after 15 months of operation only 40% of 
people were actually aware of the cameras (Ditton etal 1999) and in Berlin out of thirty-five 
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shopping malls with video surveillance two-thirds of them did not advertise its presence 
(Helten and Fischer 2004).  Finally, the power of the panopticon is also based on the certainty 
of an authoritative response to acts of non-conformity.  But as our data show, the majority of 
systems are monitored irregularly by staff who have a host of other responsibilities.  Even 
where dedicated monitoring staff are available there is no guarantee they will be actually 
watching the screens. 
  
The development of public-private CCTV networks also facilitates the targeting of known 
offenders and a return to pre-disciplinary ideas of expulsion and exclusions (McCahill 2002; 
Von Hirsch 2002). In the context of the shopping mall, Wakefield has shown that exclusion 
can be a dominant strategy of control.  In her study of one English mall, over a five-week 
period 578 people were excluded and 65% of these exclusion involved ‘known offenders’ 
(Wakefield 2000).  However, as McCahill found in a study of a north of England mall, it was 
anonymous groups of teenagers who were most likely to be targeted, deployed against and 
ejected.  Not because of any past or present legal infraction but because they were, in dress 
and demeanour, seen to be disrupting the commercial image of the mall.  Similarly in an Oslo 
mall, Lomell (2004) found that unkempt appearance, rather that criminal behaviour, was most 
likely to attract the attention of the operatives, and result in deployment and ejection. 
 
Finally, just as the rapid rise of CCTV can be explained by the duality of its appeal to the 
principles of the ‘old’ and the ‘new penologies’, the practice of CCTV surveillance also 
reflects this duality.  This is because when we speak of CCTV we are not speaking of a 
technology, we are speaking of a socio-technical system.  In themselves, cameras, cables, 
lenses, video-recorders and display monitors have little social or criminological significance.  
It is only when CCTV becomes embedded in a set of enculturated organisational practices 
that it impinges on the social.  Whether CCTV represents an extension of discipline, or a post-
disciplinary technology and whether it epitomises the values of the ‘old’ penology or the 
‘new’, cannot be known in advance - it all depends on how it is used in practice. 
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